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I: Introduction 
 Following Tunisia, Egypt was the second Arab nation to engage in the Arab 
Spring, as massive civil uprisings in protest of its former repressive dictator Hosni 
Mubarak succeeded in toppling his regime after thirty years of rule.  While this 
revolution had set and achieved its primary goal – to overthrow Mubarak – it did not, 
however, include a plan for the restructuring of the Egyptian political system after the fall 
of its leader in February of 2011. Consequently, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF), the leaders of the Egyptian military, assumed power following 
Mubarak’s exit, promising to “maintain the homeland”1 in the process of preparing to 
hold free elections in the near future.  The SCAF ‘maintained the homeland’ for 17 
months after the fall of their former leader, until elections were finally held in June of 
2012. On June 24th, Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was 
declared the fifth president of Egypt. 
 Morsi is Egypt’s first civilian president. Ever since the Free Officers Revolution 
of 1952, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of military leaders, including Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, political and economic 
authority has since rested in the hands of the military. In order to establish and maintain a 
functional and representational democracy in this period of post-revolution transition, this 
hierarchy of power must be reversed: civilian leadership must be able to control the 
intentions and actions of the military. This change is significant and will be difficult to 
                                                          
1
 “Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: Statements and Key Leaders,” New York Times, 14 
February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/20110210-egypt-
supreme-council.html. 
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accomplish given the degree to which the military has enjoyed its dominant role in 
Egyptian society over the past sixty years. 
The underlying challenge at the heart of the civil-military question is how to 
“reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a 
military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”2  This is a 
rather interesting paradox: “because we fear others we create an institution of violence to 
protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.”3  What is most 
perplexing of all, I believe, is that no one knows the right answer to the question.  As the 
newly elected civilian president of Egypt, Morsi must navigate his way and prove his 
legitimacy in a society where the line between too much military authority and too little 
military authority is ambiguous. If Morsi goes too far in suppressing military authority in 
the coming months, he runs the risk of catalyzing a military coup against his government. 
On the other hand, if he gives the armed forces too much leeway, the military has the 
capacity to undermine his civilian leadership, and make him more of a symbolic 
figurehead than an actual source of governing power. 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the strategic approaches 
undertaken by Egypt’s former leaders in an overall attempt to provide a comprehensive 
answer to this central question: what are President Morsi’s strategies for controlling the 
military in post-revolutionary Egypt? I will argue that, while Morsi has demonstrated his 
desire to control the armed forces through various institutional changes, his efforts have 
fallen short of attacking the heart of the problem, which is the deeply-rooted militaristic 
                                                          
2
 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian 
Control”, Armed Forces and Society, 23 (1996):149. 
3
 Ibid, 150. 
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culture that has come to be valued and accepted by Egyptian society throughout the 
course of the last sixty years.  
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II. Civil-Military Theory 
 In the following section, I provide an analysis of civil-military theory from a 
variety of standpoints, both historical and contemporary. The purpose of this section is to 
offer a basic understanding of the ways in which civilian and military institutions are 
inclined to balance power in society.  
Huntington & Janowitz 
Civil-military relations refers to the relationship between civil and military 
authority in a given society.  The study of civil-military relations is extensive, as it 
pertains to a variety of subject matters and academic areas, including political science, 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, law, and the like. Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz serve as the founders of the contemporary study of civil-military relations in the 
age of liberal democracy, bringing with them the generally accepted normative belief that 
civilian authority is preferable to military control of the state. In order to maintain the 
liberal values intrinsic to democracy, the civilian authority must be able to control its 
military. But how can this be done? 
 Huntington, “arguably the greatest American political scientist of our time,”4 
introduced his theory of civil-military relations in his book The Soldier and the State.  He 
sees civilian control as a function of either “objective control” or “subjective control”.5 
Objective control is the process by which the military maximizes its professionalism, 
removing it from any sort of political involvement. More specifically, it is the 
“distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most 
                                                          
4
 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, (New York: The 
Free Press, 2002), 4. 
5
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1981), 83. 
5 
 
conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of 
the officer corps.”6 It isolates the military from politics, renders it politically neutral, but 
gives it “as free a hand as possible in military matters.”7  Subjective control is, instead, 
the maximization of civilian power in relation to the military – a process that is 
complicated by “the large number, varied character, and conflicting interests” of civilian 
groups within a society.8  Objective control, therefore, is the healthier and more effective9 
approach to civilian control of the military organization in any given state, according to 
Eliot Cohen. It is often referred to as a liberal theory primarily concerned that the 
structure of civil-military relations is such that it enables the military to “protect 
democratic values by defeating external threats.”10 
 Conversely, Morris Janowitz proposes what is commonly referred to as a civic-
republic theory of democratic civil-military relations, which is concerned more that civil-
military relations are able to sustain democratic values – “especially the value of civic 
virtue – by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier’s role.”11 In other 
words, civilian control comes from greater civic participation by both soldiers and 
civilians alongside one another. While Janowitz’ theory is also concerned with 
professionalism as is Huntington’s, he sees the military’s politicization as somewhat 
unavoidable.12   
 
                                                          
6
 Ibid, 83. 
7
 Cohen, 4. 
8
 Huntington, 80. 
9
 Cohen, 4. 
10
 James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 29 (2002): 
12. 
11
 Ibid, 12. 
12
 Ibid, 12. 
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Contemporary Theories of Civil-Military Relations 
Both of these theories, while they have served as a general basis for subsequent 
civil-military theory, are somewhat outdated. They were conceived in the historical 
context of the Cold War when the Soviet threat required the U.S. military to maintain a 
large standing army for the first time, which was controversial because no one knew if its 
permanence within the state would threaten civilian authority, and therefore undermine 
America’s ability to sustain a liberal democracy.13  Many of the theories that have 
emerged since are concerned primarily with newly formed democracies, often 
highlighting the changes in civil-military relations that occur when a state transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy.  These are the theories that are the most relevant to 
this paper’s discussion of Egyptian civil-military relations. 
Deborah Norden, for instance, uses Huntington’s theory as a springboard in her 
discussion of civil-military relations in Latin America. She argues that the case of 
Venezuela discredits the necessity for complete civilian oversight of the armed forces, 
and that it was actually the “government’s ability to fit the armed forces into its broader 
policy goals” that allowed “for relatively more political authority over the military than 
[what] might [have been] expected.”14 The way she rationalizes her theory is by breaking 
down the three elements of control: domination, who commands the armed force; 
management, who directs the armed forces; and authority, what militaries believe.15 A 
government need not possess all three dimensions of control; the more facets achieved, 
                                                          
13
 Feaver, 159. 
14
 Deborah Norden, “Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance? Assessing Venezuelan Political-
Military Relations under Chavez,” 2007, 1. 
15
 Ibid, 1-2. 
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however, the more control the civilian authority has over the military.16  In the 
Venezuelan case, therefore, civilian control stemmed from a shared political ideology.   
Rebecca Schiff offers an alternative model, the theory of concordance, which 
interprets effective civil-military relations as a function of coordinated institutional 
efforts.  Schiff proposes that this cooperation should occur between “three partners – the 
military, the political elites, and the citizenry” in determining “the social composition of 
the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military 
style.”17 She argues that the main issue with the current theory of civil-military relations 
is that it requires militaries to remain “physically and ideologically separated from 
political institutions.”18 This theory of separation derives from the American civil-
military experience, which “assumes that American institutional separation should be 
applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention.”19 The American case, 
however, is in many ways specific to its historical and cultural legacies, which renders it 
inadequate as a standard basis of civil-military theory for other nations.20 The 
concordance theory does not base its rationale on the American case; instead, it 
“considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other 
possibilities for civil-military relations.”21 
The theories of both Norden and Schiff prove that developing societies involve a 
wide range of complex variables that affect civil-military relations. Consequently, the 
challenge of controlling the armed forces differs depending on these variables. A state’s 
                                                          
16
 Ibid, 3. 
17
 Rebecca Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces & 
Society, 22 (1995): 7. 
18
 Ibid, 7. 
19
 Ibid, 8. 
20
 Ibid, 8. 
21
 Ibid, 8. 
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national ethos, the military’s sense of purpose and role, the prevalence of stable or 
unstable institutions within the state, the type of government in place, and the state’s 
historical legacy are all among the elements that influence the balance between civilian 
and military authority within a developing nation. 
In his subsequent piece Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Huntington provides 
a discussion pertaining to the question of civil-military relations in developing countries. 
He argues that new democracies – especially those emerging from authoritarian regimes 
– face four primary challenges: 1) the definition of the military’s specific roles; 2) 
military political intervention; 3) “pre-existing military privileges”; 4) and “the 
development and diffusion of new military technology.”22 While all four of these 
challenges apply to the Egyptian case, the first three are particularly central to this paper.  
Important Themes 
For the purposes of this paper, several themes will be important to the discussion 
of civil-military relations in Egypt.  First of all, professionalism will be mentioned quite 
frequently throughout my analysis. According to Roderic Camp, professionalism has five 
distinct characteristics: 
(1)it must be based upon a body of systematic theory  
(for example, theories of warfare); (2) its members  
must possess differentiating expertise (for example,  
knowledge of military strategy and weaponry); (3)  
it must incorporate certain powers and privileges  
granted by society (for example, the military exercises  
autonomous control over its admission, training,  
and standards); (4) it must subscribe to a code of  
ethics (the most critical variable for the military  
because a code governs intra- and inter-group  
relationships); and (5) its culture, including values,  
norms, and symbols, must convey its mystique and  
                                                          
22
 Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” Journal of Democracy, 6 (1995): 14. 
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distinctions.23 
 
More generally, a professional military is one that is aware of its specific roles, is well-
trained and organized, and functions with the same degree of expertise as any other 
professional within society, whether that be a doctor, banker, or academic professor.  
 Secondly, military disengagement – or rather, de-politicization – is another key 
theme for this paper.  A military is depoliticized when it abstains from playing a direct 
political role in the government.  It can be defined as “the substitution of praetorian 
policies and personnel with these advocated by the recognized civilian authorities,” and 
occurs when the armed forces “return to the barracks and make room for some kind of 
civilian rule.”24  This means, for instance, that governmental ministries and cabinets are 
filled by civilians rather than military officers.  
Conversely, the politicization of the armed forces enables military officers to 
participate directly in governmental affairs.  According to normative standards of 
democratic civil-military theory, allowing the politicization of the military is dangerous 
because it enables the armed forces to act as another interest group within society.  In 
order to secure its interests, a politicized military may opt to use force in the place of 
diplomatic decision-making processes. As you will see, Egyptian leaders either attempted 
to politicize or depoliticize the military in their efforts to control it.  
 Cooptation is also significant to this paper, especially in its application to the 
military institution during the Mubarak era. The civilian authority typically coopts a 
military by ‘winning it over’, which can be done through the provision of certain valuable 
                                                          
23
 Roderic Camp, “Citizen and Military Views of Civil-Military Relations”, In Generals in Modern Mexico, 
2004: 2-3. 
24
 Constantine Danopoulos, From Military to Civilian Rule, London: Routledge, 1992: 1. 
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incentives.  Incentives can be monetary, in which a form of financial security is given to 
military personnel in exchange for their commitment to the civilian authority. They can 
also be political, in which military officers are promised prominent positions within the 
government in return for their political loyalty to civilian rule. In essence, it is a form of 
mutual accommodation that provides privileges in exchange for political obedience. 
Finally, civilian control is yet another central topic. It can be defined as the set of 
institutions and mechanisms – i.e., control over the budget, policy, and endowments – 
that are used to make sure that the civilian government remains fully in control of the 
instruments that have the ability to influence military power. In a democratic setting, it 
often involves the establishment of a constitution that creates a framework in which the 
tasks of legislative, executive, and judicial powers are designated to civilian control.25 
Further, military transparency is an important mechanism of democratic civilian control, 
as it pertains to “the military’s openness and its accountability toward civil society.”26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Marian Zulean, “Western Assistance in Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern 
Europe,” Sphere of Politics, 107 (2004): 22. 
26
 Ibid, 23. 
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III: The Officers’ Republic 
Between the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 and the toppling of Hosni Mubarak 
in February of 2011, Egypt was ruled by four presidents, all originating from the military: 
Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.27  
Throughout this period of nearly sixty years, the “military has dominated the country’s 
politics”, prompting the “long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the 
influence of the military establishment.”28  This has led to the emergence of what Yezid 
Sayigh refers to as the “officers’ republic”, or the “self-perpetuating military networks 
that permeate virtually all branches and levels of state administration and of the state-
owned sectors of the economy.”29  The officers’ republic not only exercises control of the 
defense budget, U.S. military assistance, and much of the Egyptian economy, it also 
enjoys “a deep sense of institutional and personal entitlement”30 – an elevated social 
status that unquestionably stems from this legacy of military dominance.  
 The centralization of power in the executive branch of the republic, not 
coincidentally “the strongest branch within”31 the Egyptian political system, is a 
fundamental characteristic of the political apparatus that enables the persistence of the 
officers’ republic. Despite, for instance, the existence of an independent judiciary branch, 
the degree of power invested in the executive is such that it negates the functionality of 
proper checks and balances. The Administrative Monitoring Agency, one of several 
oversight agencies in Egypt, serves as a pertinent example of this lopsided political 
                                                          
27
 Laurel E. Miller et al., “Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the 
Globe,” Rand National Defense Research Institute (2012): 82. 
28
 Ibid, 82. 
29
 Yezid Sayigh, “Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt”, The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (2012): 3. 
30
 Ibid, 3. 
31
 Miller et al., 82. 
12 
 
system. It was established in 1958 “to investigate administrative and financial violations” 
with a mandate “to combat corruption throughout the country and in the entire state 
apparatus.”32 The only component of the state over which the Administrative Monitoring 
Agency cannot exert its jurisdiction is the armed forces, because the military is not 
subject to “any civilian oversight beyond that of the president, who until Morsi’s election 
had always been an ex-military man.”33  This exemplifies an instance of reciprocity, in 
which the regime looks out for the corporate interests of the military in exchange for 
unfaltering military loyalty and support for the regime. The notion of reciprocity is one 
that extends throughout the entirety of the Egyptian republic, supporting the argument 
that “the military remains central to Egyptian politics because it provides the power base 
for the president and protection for the regime.”34  This reciprocal relationship is a threat 
to the future of Egyptian democracy, in that it allows the military to become a prominent 
political actor in the democratic state. 
 International factors have also contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the 
officers’ republic within Egyptian society. The military disaster of the 1967 Six-Day War 
with Israel prompted Nasser to initiate policies that would improve the effectiveness of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces as a military entity of force and national security.  Further, 
Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet Union and the United States greatly influenced its 
ability to maintain a professional military.   
In this post-revolution transitional period, Egypt’s only chance of securing a true 
democracy – one in which a non-corrupt, non-military, representative, and transparent 
                                                          
32
 Sayigh, 12. 
33
 Ibid, 12. 
34
 Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?”, Middle East 
Journal 57 (2003): 287. 
13 
 
government is put in place to genuinely serve and protect the interests of the Egyptian 
people – is through the disassembling of the officers’ republic.  If President Morsi’s 
administration fails to do so, then the officers’ republic “will use its extensive political 
reach and its control over key bureaucratic and economic enclaves to subvert any future 
government of which it disapproves.”35  A complete unraveling of the officers’ republic, 
however, requires knowledge of precisely how it was wound up in the first place: what 
measures did Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak take individually to establish and enhance the 
robustness of the military institution throughout the last sixty years?  
This paper finds that Egypt’s past leaders have used different variations of four 
main strategies in their respective efforts to control the armed forces: politicization, de-
politicization, professionalization, and cooptation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Sayigh, 4. 
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IV: Nasser, 1956-1970 
Nasser’s Ascendance to Power 
 On July 23 of 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers called the Free Officers 
Movement took power of the Egyptian state through the execution of a bloodless coup 
d’etat.36  Led in part by the young officer Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military uprising was 
provoked by widespread discontent with Egypt’s lack of independence: under King 
Farouk’s monarchical rule, Egypt was nothing more than Britain’s colonial puppet. The 
dismantling of the king and the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and therefore of Egypt’s 
connection to its imperial counterpart, would introduce a new chapter in the progression 
of Egypt’s political history.   
After the establishment of the new republic, Muhammad Naguib became the first 
President of Egypt in 1953.  His time in office, however, was rather short-lived, as 
contention rooted in power politics between Gamal Abdel Nasser and he ultimately led to 
his forced removal from office.37  In June of 1956, 99.9% of five million Egyptians voted 
in favor of Nasser, the only running candidate, for president under a newly formed 
constitution that made Egypt a socialist Arab state with a one-party political system.38  
Nasser’s regime, which reigned from 1956 until 1970, directed Egypt down a pathway of 
almost complete military political dominance, a legacy that persisted up until the fall of 
the Mubarak regime in 2011. 
 
Nasser’s Strategies 
                                                          
36
 Robert St. John, “Gamal Abdel Nasser”, Encyclopedia Britannica: Academic Edition, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/404045/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser. 
37
 Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004, 55. 
38
 St. John. 
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In order to control the armed forces, therefore, Nasser’s main strategy involved 
extensive military politicization: he intentionally staffed “the cabinet, ministries, and state 
machinery with military personnel.”39  This was Nasser’s way of gaining control over a 
bureaucracy that had been traditionally independent.40  This policy backfired in 1967, 
when Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt.  In response, Nasser sought to reverse 
his tactic of politicization, and with the help of the Soviet Union, he began to 
professionalize the ranks of the military as well.   
Nasser transformed Egypt into what Anouar Abdel-Malek refers to as “une 
société militaire, ”41a military society, wherein the armed forces became the primary 
agents of societal transformation.  Under Nasser, the military not only served to protect 
the regime, but it also participated significantly in governing alongside the president.  
Military officers were given prominent positions in the cabinet, ministries, and state 
machinery to an almost overwhelming degree: “of 18 cabinets between 1952 and 1970, 
only the first (lasted for less than two months) was headed by a civilian.”42  In addition, 
out of 100 top positions in the Foreign Ministry in 1962, 72 of them were occupied by 
military officers, “and all ambassadors to Europe except for three were officers.”43  The 
three successive political organizations created by the regime (the Liberation rally (LR), 
the National Union (NU), and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)) were also largely 
controlled by military men.44 
                                                          
39
 Kelsey Miller, “Can NATO React to the Arab Spring?” The Henry M. Jackson School of International 
Studies (2012): 72. 
40
 Miller, 72. 
41
 Sayigh, 10. 
42
 Harb, 278. 
43
 Ibid, 279. 
44
 Ibid, 279. 
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Eliezer Beeri describes the Egyptian power structure under Nasser at the time of 
his death in 1970 as a three-tiered pyramid. Nasser occupied the pinnacle of the pyramid, 
representing his exceptional position as ruler of the state.  The second tier of power 
included nine individuals who were “vice-presidents, prime ministers, and Speakers of 
the People’s Assembly,” and all of whom were either former or active military officers.45  
The third tier “consisted of the different deputy premiers between 1962 and 1967, 42 in 
all, 13 of whom were from the military.”46  Within all three of these tiers, therefore, 42% 
of the ruling elite were officers.47  
Nasser’s economic policies further entrenched military dominance in Egyptian 
society. In an effort to make Egypt economically independent, Nasser imposed radical 
economic strategies that effectively transformed the Egyptian economy from a private 
dominated sector economy to a public dominated sector economy. The nationalization of 
the Suez Canal, the confiscation and redistribution of land, and the seizure of all privately 
owned financial institutions helped to fortify this economic transformation. By 1965, “the 
public sector contributed 95% of all investment and controlled 83% of all means of 
production.”48 Consequently, the Egyptian bureaucracy “increased by 161% between 
1961-1962 and 1970-1971”, and the number of ministries increased from 15 to 28 
between 1952 and 1970.49  Military officers, with their close connection to the 
revolutionary regime and to the sentiments of the president, were suddenly presented 
with a large bureaucracy and many positions to be filled.   
                                                          
45
 Ibid, 279. 
46
 Ibid, 279. 
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 Ibid, 279. 
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 Ibid, 278. 
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 Ibid, 278. 
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During the Nasser era, retired military officers also received key posts in the state 
that lay completely beyond the sphere of government.   In fact, Abdel-Malek estimates 
that approximately “1,500 officers had been appointed to the upper ranks of the non-
military establishment,” occupying high-profile positions in “culture, the press, radio and 
television,” as well as senior administrative positions of the boards of public 
corporations, etc.50  Nasser effectively transformed the military into a multi-functional 
political body, managing to mold the Egyptian society into one that valued the military as 
such.  In this way, the president was able to maintain control of his military by ensuring 
his officers’ economic wellbeing and political prominence in exchange for their support 
and undying loyalty to the regime. 
The 1967 Six-Day War 
Nasser’s strategy of control, however, proved to be defective when Egypt was 
faced with a real external threat from Israel on June 5th of 1967.  In a surprise attack, 
Israeli jets succeeded in completely demolishing a large portion of Egypt’s air force, and 
in the following days the Israeli ground forces were able to defeat the Egyptian army and 
seize the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.51 Imad Harb argues that the defeat was 
“precipitated by a combination of factors including command and control problems and 
the politicization of the military command.”52  The factionalism, lack of qualification and 
military training, and disorganized nature of the military that resulted from its 
politicization essentially rendered the military useless in its capacity to function as the 
defender and protector of the Egyptian state. 
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 Sayigh,10-11. 
51
 Harb, 281. 
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 Ibid, 281. 
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The politicization of the armed forces, however, was not the only factor 
contributing to its inadequacy in the 1967 Six-Day War.  Egypt’s international and 
regional standing in the years leading up to the 1967 war significantly influenced its lack 
of military readiness.  Nasser’s foreign policy throughout the early 1960’s greatly 
focused on the plans of a unified Arab state system53, of which he would be the leader. 
This vision “created tremendous intra-Arab conflict,” and consequently “left little time 
for concerns about Israel” during the period leading up to the June attack of 1967.54  
Egypt was not inclined, therefore, to “secure a greater commitment from foreign actors”55 
because it was largely preoccupied with regional engagements.  
Not surprisingly, Egypt did not seek a great deal of military assistance from the 
Soviet Union in the years leading up to 1967, its closest great power ally at the time.  As 
early as 1955, the Soviet Union served as Egypt’s principal arms supplier; yet the 
relationship was tainted by a mutual suspicion of “each other’s motivations and the 
potential costs of any close association or level of commitment.”56 In comparison to the 
years after the 1967 war, in which increased Israeli security threats and domestic 
instability prompted greater reliance on the Soviet Union and on regional actors, the years 
before the war demonstrated Egypt’s lack of international support.57 Egypt’s limited 
external financial assistance contributed, alongside its politicization, to the military’s 
failure in the 1967 Six-Day War.   
                                                          
53
 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of 
Egypt, 1962-73,” International Organization 45 (1991): 379. 
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With increased military support from the Soviet Union, Nasser professionalized 
the military ranks by providing improved training, equipment, and instruction.  Between 
1967 and 1972, for instance, “the number of Soviet troops and advisers stationed in Egypt 
increased from” 500 to nearly 15,000.58  In fact, by 1970 the Soviet Union had infiltrated 
“all levels of Egyptian defense planning”: it had retrained the Egyptian army, funded 
practically all of its weaponry, and provided additional financial support for Egypt’s war 
effort.59   
In addition to using Soviet aid to professionalize the military, Nasser also sought 
to depoliticize the Egyptian armed forces.  While both Nasser and Field Marshal ‘Abd al-
Hakim ‘Amr “tended their resignations”60 in the days that followed the 1967 fiasco, it 
was ‘Amr’s suicide that changed the way the military as a political entity would be 
conceptualized in the future. Harb believes that ‘Amr’s death 
Signaled a new approach to the military that centered on  
a lessened political role in the regime (although military  
presence in the cabinet immediately following the defeat  
spiked) and devotion to the duty of regaining the Sinai,  
preparedness for a long war, and professionalism.61 
 
On June 11th, Nasser expunged the ranks of the military leadership that were opposed to 
him, and filled the new officer corps with a second generation of officers: those who were 
not directly affiliated with the 1952 Free Officers Movement.  Separated from this 
movement, the new generation of officers was thought to be depoliticized in the sense 
that it had no connection to the “revolutionary ethos and history”62 that contributed to the 
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failure of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel. Despite this transformation, however, the 
Free Officers organization was able to maintain its influence within the top elite as 
ministers and advisors, and would later serve as a sizeable obstacle to Sadat’s ascension 
to power. 
Howard J. Dooley, author of “Nasser and DeGaulle: Heroes in Search of a Role”, 
makes an interesting and reflective comparison between Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and France’s Charles DeGaulle in January of 1971, only a few months after the deaths of 
both of these “giants of world politics.”63  Dooley argues that what Nasser and DeGaulle 
shared in common was their raw ambition, political brilliance, and ability to alter the 
course of history: “both were not merely politicians, but phenomena that often defied 
logical analysis.”64  Nasser, the “Afro-Asian nationalist”, managed to take a small and 
underdeveloped nation and turn it into a “world force for the first time in more than 2000 
years.”65  He proved to his people that Egypt could overcome its social and economic 
depravity, and that it was a country worthy of international prestige and respect.  He 
contributed significantly to the beginning of Egyptian modernization, and effectively 
turned the country into the Arab leader of political and military power by the time of his 
death in 1970.66  
When Nasser’s strategy of military politicization proved defective in the 1967 
war, he instituted a two-pronged strategy of professionalization and political 
disengagement. Upon Sadat’s ascendance to power in 1970, he continued to implement 
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Nasser’s strategy of professionalization and de-politicization, but to a much greater 
extent.  
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V: Anwar al-Sadat, 1970-1981 
Sadat’s Strategies  
Anwar al-Sadat, technically the third president of the Egyptian Republic, came 
into office after Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970, bringing with him an entirely new 
set of ideological and political changes that would serve to significantly alter the role of 
the Egyptian military.  Much like his predecessor, Sadat used the military as the 
foundation upon which he grew his legitimacy and power; yet, the tactics he used to 
control the armed forces differed greatly.  He was able to completely subordinate the 
military under his civilian command through strategies of professionalization and de-
politicization.  Sadat also used ‘divide and  rule’ tactics to enhance military obedience.  
Further, his dominance over the military stemmed from his unwillingness to tolerate 
dissent of any form or degree throughout the entire state apparatus.  
Sadat’s Corrective Revolution  
Initially, it was difficult for Sadat to foster a legitimate political base with a strong 
support system because unlike Nasser, he did not ascend to power in a revolution.  
Instead of starting from scratch, as Nasser had done, Sadat was forced to begin his 
presidency within the Nasserist framework, an internal system that had definitively 
reached an impasse by the mid-1960s.67 Further, Nasser’s enormous popularity worked 
against Sadat in his accession to the presidency: he had “no political base of his own, no 
charisma similar to Nasir’s, and [was] hated by his predecessor’s lieutenants for 
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inheriting their hero’s legacy.”68  What was Sadat’s solution to this resistance? A 
comprehensive purge of all those who were opposed to him and his regime.  
 This purge, coined the “Corrective Revolution”, occurred in May of 1971.  It 
eliminated specific Nasserist enemies within the military and the Arab Socialist Union 
who Sadat saw as threatening to his position, including the band of Free Officers that 
remained in office from Nasser’s government.69  He replaced this inner core of power 
with several personal advisors and chief ministers who enjoyed “extremely close personal 
relations with Sadat,” forming a sort of “royal family”.70 The Corrective Revolution 
would be the first purge of many, as Sadat was not willing to tolerate virtually any degree 
of opposition within his regime, despite his talk of ‘democracy’. Instead, he preferred to 
build his regime almost purely on trust, appointing “to high office people whom he 
trust[ed] … and whose reactions to any given set of circumstances [were] broadly similar 
to his own.”71 Otherwise, those who disagreed with Sadat to an extent that he deemed 
inappropriate were thoughtlessly dismissed from their positions.72  For instance, Sadat 
“jailed Fawzi, arrested Sadiq, exiled Shazli, and retired Gamassi,”73 because he saw these 
individuals as directly threatening to his supreme command.   
Within historical literature, Sadat is often described as a particularly dynamic, 
determined, and dominant leader; but one that was perpetually suspicious of his fellow 
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elites.74  It was this wariness that contributed significantly to the ways in which Sadat 
consolidated his power, both within his inner circle of elites and within the Egyptian 
armed forces.  Unlike Nasser, who was constrained by his Free Officer comrades – “men 
who made the revolution with him, and who, far from being his creatures, were relatively 
permanent members of a team not easily disregarded and who on occasion could defy 
him” – Sadat was controlled by no one.75  The elite under Sadat were better described as 
“‘his’ men” than as his equals or colleagues, as they were frequently ambiguous persons 
appointed to power, to whom Sadat had no obligation.76  In fact, Sadat made it a point to 
periodically refresh the ranks of the elite in order to prevent any individual from feeling a 
sense of permanency, which would challenge the supremacy of the president.  He 
maintained few advisors and seldom consulted with them, often making major decisions 
single-handedly with little instruction.77  As a result, Sadat emerged as the absolute 
pinnacle of power during his reign; no other power centers apart from the president were 
able to form – not even the military. 
 As a result of Sadat’s thorough consolidation of power, he was able to finally and 
completely subordinate the Egyptian military to his civilianized presidential leadership. 
To be able to control the military, Sadat not only dismissed officers who disagreed with 
him, but he also used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to manipulate the officer corps, pitting 
individual officers against each other to thwart their attention away from the president.78  
Sadat replaced, for instance, the Minister of War General Muhammad Sadiq with the 
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apolitical General Ahmad Hasan ‘Ali because Sadiq had objected to Sadat’s war plans 
against Israel.79  He managed the military in the same way that he managed his inner core 
of elites: through a combination of sidelining, dismissals, and divide and rule strategies. 
What resulted was an exceptionally loyal and obedient military. 
Professionalization 
 Sadat also sought to professionalize the armed forces. The 1967 defeat under 
Nasser’s command proved to Sadat that the Egyptian military needed to reorient its focus 
toward accepting more of a professionalized and depoliticized role within the state. The 
most evident example of professionalism during Sadat’s presidency is the amount of 
attention paid to improving recruitment, equipment, and training.80  In preparation for the 
1973 surprise attack on Israel, therefore, Sadat pressured the Soviet Union – Egypt’s 
strongest great power ally at the time – to supply the Egyptian military with the most up-
to-date arms technology to match that of Israel.81 A greater effort was made to recruit 
university graduates to fill the ranks of junior officers and tank commanders, and the 
implementation of a more rigid training program reestablished confidence and legitimacy 
in the military.82 Although the Egyptians technically lost the 1973 October war in the 
sense of pure military combat, the “professionalization of the officer corps has implied 
unquestioning acceptance of the commands of legitimate authority – that is, of the 
president.”83 
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From the Soviet Union to the United States 
 An important outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the shift in partnership 
from the Soviet Union to the United States.  Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” 
during the war, in which he negotiated a deal with Sadat that “eventually culminated in 
President Anwar Sadat’s willingness to make peace with Israel,”84 had huge implications 
for Egypt’s military. These negotiations led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 between 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Anwar Sadat, 
setting the stage the following year for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.85 Both the Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty and the Egypt-U.S. strategic partnership represent alliances resulting 
from the 1973 Yom Kippur war that have persisted to this day. 
Making peace with Israel, although condemned by many Arab states, was 
essentially Sadat’s way of getting closer to the United States.86  What Egypt lost in 
financial assistance from his Arab neighbors and the Soviet Union was supplanted by the 
enormous benefits received from its new partnership with the U.S.  Starting in 1979, 
“Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. bilateral foreign 
assistance,”87 and has received approximately $35 billion in military assistance since 
then.88  While Egypt values its relationship with the U.S. for basic economic reasons, its 
primary incentive to sustain a close relationship has been the “U.S. support for Egypt’s 
military, and thus for its governing regime.”89  This relationship significantly enhanced 
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the professionalization of the military, as Sadat could use U.S. military funds to provide 
exceptional training and up-to-date weaponry. 
De-politicization  
 Depoliticizing the armed forces was yet another strategy that Sadat took to control 
the military. Whereas in 1967 the military occupied between 41% to 66% of key 
government positions, that figure was reduced significantly to only 22% in 1972.90 Under 
Nasser, approximately one-third of the elite was comprised of military officers; in Sadat’s 
later years, only one in ten elites had originated from the officer corps.91 Sadat’s political 
reorientation essentially made it so that a military career no longer presented a direct 
pathway into the political elite. 
 Sadat’s economic policies also helped to disengage the military from the political 
sphere. In an effort to open the Egyptian economy for development, Sadat imposed a 
range of liberalization policies as part of his Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP).92  
These policies implied decreased spending on the military.93  Despite the smaller defense 
budget, as Miller suggests, “the military-industrial complex was growing and becoming 
more self-sufficient.” 94   
Bread Riots of 1977 
A testament to the military’s subordination under Sadat – a product of its 
professionalization and de-politicization – was the military’s reaction to the bread riots of 
1977.  Egypt was one of several Arab states involved in a “Mediterranean debt crescent” 
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in the 1970s.95  Often upon the request of the International Monetary Fund, authoritarian 
elites throughout the Arab world responded to massive debt by subscribing to the 
neoliberal ideology, a Western economic theory that promotes open markets and a 
limited economic role for the state.96  This meant, however, significant cuts to subsidies 
that were previously provided by the state as a part of what James Gelvin refers to as the 
‘ruling bargain’, or the “accommodation reached between the states and the citizens they 
govern.”97 Citizens were essentially stripped of their access to certain ordinary 
commodities that they depended on, prompting many to take to the streets in protest of 
this new economic practice. This is precisely what instigated the bread riots of 1977 in 
Egypt. In order to quell the protests throughout the state, Sadat called upon the military to 
restore order. The armed forces complied, and obediently returned to their barracks 
shortly after the uprising.98 
We can compare this instance of mass protest to that of the 2011 revolution.   
Like the bread riots of 1977, part of the Egyptian resentment for the Mubarak regime 
resulted from a deteriorating economy.  In March of 2008, for instance, Egypt 
experienced widespread bread shortages, which eliminated affordable access to a staple 
food product of the Egyptian diet. Egypt spends roughly US$2.75 billion annually to 
subsidize the cost of bread to Egyptians, an example of the social contract – the ruling 
bargain – that continues to exist between the state and its people.99  Among other 
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instances of economic insufficiencies, including price hikes and banking scandals100, 
Egypt’s economic conditions leading up to both the 1977 bread riots and the 2011 
revolution were a major source of public dissatisfaction with the government.  
Shortly after the police force collapsed within the first week of the 2011 uprising, 
Mubarak called upon the army to open fire on the demonstrators in order to silence their 
protests.101 The armed forces refused the president’s request, a decision that I believe 
determined the outcome of the revolution. Whereas Sadat had basically issued the same 
order in 1977 that Mubarak had to his military in 2011, Sadat’s military acquiesced 
without hesitation, while Mubarak’s military refused. A fundamental difference, 
therefore, exists between the armed forces under Sadat and the armed forces under 
Mubarak: the independence with which Mubarak’s military behaved during the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011 is something that lacked in the era of Sadat.  The independence that 
Mubarak bestowed upon the military was originally intended as a tactic of control; yet, it 
was the military’s autonomy that ultimately led to Mubarak’s demise. 
Sadat’s Military 
Through the processes of depoliticizing and professionalizing the military, Sadat 
was able to exclude military elite from political decision-making, yet simultaneously hold 
the military establishment completely under his control. As a result, the military society 
that flourished under the rule of Nasser declined, transforming its role from protector of 
the revolution against imperialism and Zionism into a functional security apparatus that 
guarded the order of the Egyptian state.   By the time Sadat was assassinated in 1981i, he 
had come close to reconciling what Peter Feaver refers to as the “civil-military 
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problematique”: the establishment of a military that is “strong enough to do anything the 
civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians 
authorize them to do.”102 His successor, Hosni Mubarak, would introduce yet again an 
entirely new age for the Egyptian military, one that drew components from both Nasser’s 
Egypt and Sadat’s to create a new era of civil-military relations.  
Sadat, therefore, amplified the policies of professionalism and de-politicization 
first introduced by Nasser at the end of his rule. Sadat’s control also stemmed from the 
way in which he sought unquestioned power for himself: through policies of dismissals 
and divide and rule tactics.  
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VI: Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011 
Mubarak’s Strategies 
 The Egyptian officers’ republic, as coined by Yezid Sayigh, reached its most 
entrenched state during the rule of Hosni Mubarak. While Mubarak continued to 
implement Sadat’s policies of de-politicization and professionalization, he also sought to 
draw the entire officer corps into his own system of crony patronage and privileged 
access at the same time through a strategy of cooptation, which gave the military 
economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy in the state. Like the militaries of Nasser 
and Sadat, what resulted from Mubarak’s policies was an extremely loyal and obedient 
military. Unlike the militaries of Nasser and Sadat, however, Mubarak’s military 
transformed into one that “became invisible by virtue of its very ubiquity.”103  
The officers’ republic existed in nearly every sector of the civilian sphere of 
Egyptian society, to the point where its pervasiveness became normal, and thus 
accepted.104 Moreover, the military under Mubarak finally solidified into a stable 
institution, whose professionalism warranted the president’s policy of “ceding certain 
independent functions to it.”105  By granting the Egyptian Armed Forces significant 
economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy through the implementation of certain 
advantageous policies, Mubarak gained in return a loyal military that, like the militaries 
of Nasser and Sadat, served as his base of power and legitimacy.  
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Why Cooptation? 
 Mubarak’s extensive use of cooptation under his crony patronage system was his 
main strategy of coercing political loyalty for his regime.  The need to augment Sadat’s 
strategies of professionalization and de-politicization with cooptation was perhaps a 
consequence of conditions relating to the post-Cold War environment.  These conditions 
include the expansion and increased professionalization of the armed forces due to 
Egypt’s military partnership with the United States, as well as the liberalization policies 
that ensued in the post-Cold War era.   
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Sadat’s diplomatic negotiations in the Camp 
David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty effectively replaced the Soviet Union 
with the U.S. as the patron of Egypt. However, while the military under Soviet influence 
represented merely an “unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force,” the military under U.S. 
influence – and especially during the rule of Mubarak – was transformed into “a 
modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.”106  
Without the military aid of the United States during the reign of Mubarak, the 
Egyptian military would in no way be as professional as it is today. Under Mubarak’s 
regime, the military partnership with the United States grew immensely, even further than 
it had under Sadat’s rule. At the time of the revolution in January of 2011, Egypt stood as 
the 10th largest military in the world, with more than 468,000 members, and 
approximately “625 U.S. military personnel stationed in Egypt.”107  Egypt receives the 
majority of its foreign aid funds from the U.S. in the form of “three primary accounts: 
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Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International 
Military Education and Training (IMET).108  Since 1987, Egypt has received $1.3 billion 
annually from the United States in military aid.109 This has had an extraordinary impact 
on Egypt’s defense policies and purchasing power: “the $1.3 billion received in fiscal 
year 2005 comprised more than 80 percent of Egypt’s total military procurement 
budget.”110 
The military support from the United States during the Mubarak era was 
particularly influential in terms of training and technology. IMET assistance was 
significant because it enabled Egyptian military personnel to be trained by American 
standards of military education.111  Egypt and the United States started coproducing 
M1A1 Abrams Battle tanks in 1988, an enterprise that serves as “one of the cornerstones 
of U.S. military assistance to Egypt” today.112  Additionally, the FMF program enabled 
the transfer of actual military technology: “specific examples of purchases since 1979 
include 220 F-16 aircraft, three dozen Apache helicopters, and 880 M1A1 (Abrams) 
tanks.”113  In contrast to Soviet and U.S. military aid during the Sadat era, the U.S. 
military assistance during the Mubarak era was much more significant, in both monetary 
and technical terms.  
 Further, Mubarak implemented enhanced liberalization policies which enabled 
political parties to become “freer to operate publicly” in the post-Cold War era.114  Even 
“those adhering to a mild form of Islamic radicalism” were permitted to engage in 
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politics to a certain extent.115 This meant that Mubarak’s regime was surrounded by 
various organizations of opposition, which directly threatened his position as the supreme 
leader of Egypt. In order to negate the prevalence of opposition within society, I believe 
that Mubarak used the strategy of military cooptation in order to broaden his basis of 
support.  According to Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, the reason why autocrats 
survive for decades is directly related to their “overwhelming monopoly of force.”116 
When they are faced with opposition either from within the ruling elite or from outsiders 
within society, these rulers tend to rely on the support of certain institutions to maintain 
their position.117  Mubarak needed the military institution to protect his regime because it 
acted as a deterrent to dissenting political parties.   
 In part, this could explain why Mubarak sought to strengthen his military in the 
post-Cold War era through the U.S.-Egyptian military partnership previously discussed. 
While this military buildup was certainly a preemptive measure intended to defend Egypt 
against any threat to its national security, it is possible that it was also a product of 
Mubarak’s paranoia.  The cooptation of a robust military institution was Mubarak’s 
means of prolonging his presidential tenure.  As part of the bargain involved in 
cooptation, Mubarak granted the military significant economic, institutional, and judicial 
autonomy in exchange for political obedience and loyalty to his regime. Mubarak’s need 
for cooptation, therefore, explains why his military functioned much more independently 
than Sadat’s military.  The following section will address the cooptation policies 
Mubarak implemented that helped to render the military autonomous.  
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 Mubarak’s Policies of Cooptation  
In order to coopt the armed forces, Mubarak invented what was called “a loyalty 
allowance”.  Senior officers were promised this loyalty allowance upon retirement, which 
normally granted them guaranteed careers in the state sector, implying a second income 
alongside military pensions.118 The most well-connected officers often received more 
preferable settlements as retirees, including leadings positions in government ministries 
as well as “in civilian bureaucracy that offer[ed] particularly lucrative opportunities for 
extra income generation or asset accumulation.”119  In exchange for Mubarak’s loyalty 
allowance, officers were to refrain from political involvement and had no choice but to 
accept poor wages during their military careers.120  In this way, the loyalty allowance 
policy incentivized compliance with the system during the years that these officers were 
forced to basically “wait their turn.”121   
 Not only did the crony patronage system guarantee certain privileges, as in the 
case of the loyalty allowance, it also determined military promotion. Junior officers that 
were perceived to be disloyal or political by their superiors were incapable of moving 
beyond the rank of major.122  In fact, the only officers that were promoted to middle rank 
positions – positions above the rank of major - were those who had been cleared for 
advancement based on their commitment and loyalty to the Mubarak regime.123  It was 
political loyalty – not military merit – that ensured an officer’s well-being within the 
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system.124 As his crony patronage system became the backdrop of civil-military relations, 
therefore, Mubarak’s reliance on cooptation to maintain control over the armed forces 
was unparalleled by either regime that preceded his.   
  Secondly, Mubarak sought to coopt the armed forces by providing them access to 
a large portion of the Egyptian economy.  As a result, the military became a major 
producer and exporter of military equipment, household appliances, agriculture, and 
infrastructure,125 and held such private enterprises as tourist hotels and travel 
companies.126 In 1979, Law 32 gave the military “financial and institutional 
independence from the government’s budget and allowed it to open special accounts in 
commercial banks.”127  In this way, the military could truly function as an independent 
economic institution, providing the officer corps with attractive benefits such as 
improved medical care, higher personal income, and access to scarce resources.128 In 
addition, Mubarak’s shift toward the privatization of the public sector in 1991 required 
the implementation of neoliberal policies that opened the door to increased officer 
involvement in the economy.129 The military’s economic independence enabled the 
officer corps to reap important financial benefits that, in turn, solidified their commitment 
to Mubarak’s regime. 
 Finally, Mubarak ensured the institutional stability and independence of the 
military through legislative and judicial means. Not only did the military control its 
military-owned businesses and U.S. military aid, it also enjoyed “exclusive control over 
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the defense budget.”130 This last point – the control over the defense budget – requires 
particular attention, for it has important implications in the discussion of civil-military 
relations.  The fact that the defense budget rested entirely in the hands of the military 
implies that civilian oversight was nonexistent in that particular area of defense policy 
under the Mubarak regime. Within much of the literature pertaining to democratic civil-
military relations, civilian legislative oversight of the various components of defense 
policy and the armed forces is necessary in order to hold the military accountable, and 
thus under control.131 The fact that the military, and not the civilian authority, maintained 
control over the budget speaks to the degree to which the military institution was 
permitted to operate independently within the state.   
Counter to standard civil-military theory, however, the lack of adequate civilian 
oversight in this case did not pose a serious threat to Mubarak’s ability to maintain power 
– at least, not until the fall of his regime in 2011. In fact, enabling the military to exert 
itself so freely and independently throughout the state was exactly how Mubarak 
succeeded in coopting them: he protected the interests of the military in exchange for its 
undying loyalty to the regime. After all, Mubarak was a former military man himself; 
ensuring the supremacy of the military institution was in his best interest too. 
 The military’s institutional stability also stems from the structure of Egypt’s 
judicial system, which, according to Sullivan and Jones, is a broken system.132  The 
Administrative Monitoring Authority, as mentioned previously, is a judicial oversight 
body established to fight corruption throughout the state by investigating administrative 
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and financial crimes.133 The military is the only actor that is exempt from its jurisdiction, 
as the armed forces do not incur any civilian oversight other than that of the president.134 
This is a deliberate policy designed not only to grant the president exceptional judicial 
power, but also to serve as one of many gateways for the military to infiltrate the civilian 
bureaucracy.135   
 Additionally, the existence of military courts within the complex Egyptian legal 
and judicial system further accentuated the institutional autonomy of the military under 
the Mubarak regime. The military courts claim jurisdiction only over military cases. 
Under the emergency law, however, the president has the power to refer any case to the 
military courts, including cases involving civilians.136  Mubarak, despite repeated 
promises to lift it, kept in place the emergency law since 1981, “which [gave] the state 
broad power to detain suspects without charge for lengthy periods, try civilians in 
military courts, prevent public gatherings, and monitor private communications.”137  This 
is clearly a very controversial and deeply illiberal system that favors the executive power 
and the armed forces.  
Since the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF has abused its judicial powers enormously, 
most likely in attempts to demonstrate and maintain its favorable position in Egyptian 
society. In early May of 2011, the military court in Cairo sentenced a 17-year-old civilian 
boy to death, despite the fact that the death penalty is illegal for minors under standard 
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Egyptian law.138  This is part of a trend that has been going on since late January, “when 
the Army took on an expanded role in securing and governing Egypt.”139  The 
extrajudicial powers of the military, enabled by the Mubarak regime, directly threaten 
Morsi’s current leadership and the likelihood that he will be able to effectively control the 
activities of the military in the future – a necessary stipulation of legitimate democracy.  
Enabling the economic, institutional, and judicial independence of the military 
under his crony patronage system in exchange for an unfaltering loyalty to his regime is 
the process through which Hosni Mubarak controlled his armed forces. A particularly 
dangerous consequence of the military society that Mubarak created was the change in 
the Egyptian concept of social order.  Under Mubarak, the pervasiveness of the military 
throughout the entirety of the state generated an elevated social status that separated the 
military from the civilians. The military was not only the national protector, it was also 
the charitable peace-keeper, the law-maker, and the decision-maker. In other words, 
civilians became the dependents of the paternalistic military under Mubarak’s rule.140 
This was not the case in Nasser’s era.141  Only a few days before his regime fell, for 
instance, Mubarak addressed the Egyptian public as ‘his children’, standing proof of the 
fact that Mubarak and his military considered themselves to be more competent than their 
civilian counterparts142, and therefore more deserving of higher status.  This legacy, 
entrenched within Egyptian culture for the past 30 years, is not going to be easy to break. 
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If Morsi is to attempt to subordinate the military under civilian leadership, however, the 
paternalistic culture must be eradicated altogether.  
The Fall of Mubarak 
 If Mubarak’s strategies of cooptation, professionalization, and de-politicization 
effectively established this tight crony-based system, then why did he fall from power in 
2011basically at the hands of the military? 
 Crony-based authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable.  In my opinion, the 
process of gaining political loyalty through the distribution of certain privileges can only 
function for so long. The issue is that this kind of loyalty is not necessarily rooted in an 
individual’s fundamental beliefs, which provide purpose beyond the materialistic 
privileges offered by crony patronage.  In other words, a military officer will remain loyal 
to a regime under a crony-based system for as long as its promises satisfy his immediate 
material needs.  Consequently, these regimes and their co-opted military counterparts do 
not always share fundamental ideologies and morals, because their relationship never 
required this kind of deep-rooted convergence.   
 In its decision to refuse the orders of Mubarak to fire upon civilians during the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Egyptian military verified the instability of its former 
leader’s crony patronage system.  The military’s decision to side with the Egyptian 
citizenry outweighed the decision to abide by Mubarak’s request because the material 
privileges provided by the system were comparatively insignificant to the prospects of a 
democratic movement.  
 The military’s autonomy, which was a principle outcome of Mubarak’s strategy 
of cooptation, also contributed to the leader’s fall. If the military had not been as 
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economically, institutionally, and judicially autonomous as it was under Mubarak’s rule, I 
would argue that it would have had a harder time making the definitive decision to refuse 
Mubarak’s orders. As we saw throughout the nearly year and a half rule of the SCAF 
following Mubarak’s exit, the military’s independence as a self-sufficient societal 
institution proved that it had the capacity to function without the ruler.  
Its decision to side with the Egyptian people also demonstrated that the military 
was deeply politicized, despite Mubarak’s shallow strategy of de-politicization.  
Although Mubarak’s military did “not hold political positions as it did during its heyday 
under Nasir,” “the military cannot be seen as fully disengaged from politics.”143 From 
Naguib to Mubarak, all of Egypt’s presidents since 1952 have originated from the 
military.  Consequently, the military has never fully disengaged from politics in the sense 
that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak ensured the military’s institutional dominance and 
protected the military’s interests. The autonomy and politicization of the military, 
therefore, significantly contributed to the fall of the Mubarak regime.  
Finally, it is possible that the United States indirectly played a role in the fall of 
the Mubarak regime due to the strong military partnership between the two states.  In 
fact, Robert Hunter of CNN argues that “one reason Egypt’s military responded to the 
demonstrations so positively has been its long-standing ties to the U.S. military, 
stretching back three decades.”144 During the initials days of the uprising, the Egyptian 
chief of staff and a group of high-ranking officers engaged in talks with “American 
                                                          
143
 Harb, 287. 
144
 Robert E. Hunter, “Keep the U.S. aid flowing to Egypt’s military,” CNN, 09 February 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-09/opinion/hunter.egypt.aid_1_military-aid-egyptian-officers-military-
schools?_s=PM:OPINION. 
42 
 
hosts” in the Pentagon.145 These talks addressed the issue of military action in the 
Egyptian uprising, and encouraged the military to exercise restraint.146 The Egyptian 
military’s compliance with American requests suggests the degree of influence that the 
United States has in directing the revolution.  
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VII: Mohamed Morsi, 2012 - Present 
By January 25th of 2011, which marked the start of the revolution, the Egyptian 
military had transformed into a force to be reckoned with, a result of six decades under 
the rule of four successive military leaders. Right now, Egypt is suspended in a 
transitional state as the newly elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi, struggles to 
solidify his position as the leader of the people’s revolution, while simultaneously deal 
with the exceptional power and prestige of the military.  
Will the officers’ republic remain above the law? Or will Morsi be able to bring 
the military under civilian control? Is this a zero-sum game?  While the answers to these 
questions are not yet clear given the current state of the ongoing transition, a closer look 
at the changes that Morsi has implemented since he assumed office on June 30, 2012 will 
provide an indication of the direction that he has taken in regard to Egypt’s civil-military 
relations.   
On June 17, just days before Morsi was declared president under Egypt’s first 
democratic election, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a constitutional 
declaration intended to hinder the powers of the president if, in fact, Morsi were to be the 
victor.  The addendum effectively dissolved parliament on the grounds that one-third of 
its members had been illegally elected.147  The real issue for the SCAF, though, was the 
fact that the parliament was Islamist-dominated, which posed a threat to the military’s 
ability to maintain its legislative powers. By dissolving parliament, therefore, the military 
assumed all legislative powers, which “stripped Morsi of much of his presidential 
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authority.”148 The constitutional declaration also positioned the military beyond civilian 
control, and gave the SCAF permission to “appoint a new assembly if the current one is 
unable to complete the job” of drafting a new constitution.149 
In defiance of the military’s decree, Morsi recalled the formerly dissolved 
parliament on July 8th.150  It was a surprise decision, and some have even reported that the 
military had not been consulted before the ruling was made official.151 By reinstating 
parliament, Morsi abstracted legislative authority from the hands of the military and 
returned it back to parliament. In addition, he declared that within 60 days of the official 
formulation of a new constitution, parliamentary elections will be held.152  In this way, 
Morsi could strike somewhat of a compromise as to appease the parties involved in the 
construction of a new Egypt: in the short term, at least, “the military gets part of what it 
wanted – a new parliament in coming months – and Islamists can avoid a situation where 
the military dominates a legislative authority.”153  More importantly, this move 
demonstrates Morsi’s desire to limit the supra-powers of the military through 
reconciliatory – as opposed to aggressive – measures.  
On August 12, President Morsi issued another set of surprising alterations. He 
forced the retirement of two of the military’s top chiefs: Field Marshal and Defense 
Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and his deputy, Chief of Staff Sami Anan.154 He 
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appointed as his vice president top judge Mahmud Makki, and he “issued an addendum to 
Egypt’s governing March 2011 interim constitution.”155 The addendum annulled the 
SCAF’s June constitutional declaration which “placed the military beyond civilian 
control, gave the SCAF a legislative role,” and allowed the military to have control of the 
process of writing a new constitution.156 In other words, Morsi has already attempted to 
subordinate the military through a strategy of civilian control: he has taken away certain 
key legislative powers from the military, and put them into the hands of the civilian 
authority. However, while it appears that Morsi’s bold initiatives have turned the tables, 
so to speak, one question still lingers: is this enough?  
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VIII: Recent Developments 
 Despite Morsi’s strategy of civilian control, the legacies of Mubarak’s strategies 
persist.  Incontestably, the dramatic steps that Morsi has taken have spurred the symbolic 
shift in authority from the military to the presidency. Whether or not this shift will 
actually occur is another question altogether.  I see the biggest impediment to the 
successful transfer of power from the military to the presidency as being the persistence 
of a distinct Egyptian military culture that accepts the military as a superior institution.  
Throughout the past sixty years of military dominance, this militaristic culture has fully 
developed and ingrained itself into Egyptian society. Under Nasser, the military began its 
ascendance to prominence, as it enjoyed extensive political influence. Sadat, although he 
depoliticized the institution, perpetuated military dominance by transforming it into a 
professionalized force. It was under Sadat that the military gained substantial popular 
support, as it proved its valor to the Egyptian people through its military conquests, 
namely the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  Mubarak’s patronage system provided the military 
extraordinary benefits, which, in turn, worked to further elevate its status within society. 
At the start of the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s military was truly, as Yezid Sayigh says, 
above the state.157   
This is a culture accepted both by the soldiers themselves, and by the Egyptian 
people. On the one hand, the military sees itself as one of the most important – if not the 
most important – institutions in Egypt, due almost entirely to its historical legacy as such.  
On the other hand, citizens have come to conceptualize the military as the national 
unifier, the almighty protector, and the leader of the people’s revolution.  In other words, 
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this militaristic culture runs deep into Egyptian society. What Morsi has attempted to do 
thus far in his quest to subordinate the military falls short of addressing the dangers 
associated with this culture, because his initiatives have barely brushed the surface of the 
issue. He has implemented only institutional changes (i.e., recalling parliament, 
dismissing top military leaders, etc.) intended to transfer tangible powers into his civilian 
hands, and thus professionalize the military under his command. In the short run, this 
gives the illusion of progressive change towards a democratic society. In the long run, 
however, who will claim ownership of the intangible powers currently enabling the 
persistence of Egypt’s military society?  
The problem is that we, as observers, are often quick to assume that a professional 
military is one that will remain neutral and subordinate to civilian leadership, as first 
proposed by Samuel Huntington.158 The Egyptian case disproves this theory: the military 
was considered to be highly professional under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, for instance. 
However, its professionalism did not necessarily imply its neutrality; the Egyptian 
military functioned as more of an interest group than as a neutral body. In fact, one could 
argue that its professionalism led to its autonomy, which is what ultimately led to not 
only its capacity, but also its desire to influence politics. After all, it was the military’s 
refusal to fire upon protestors that entirely changed the course of the revolution.  If the 
military had complied with Mubarak’s order, it is likely that the dictator would still be in 
power today. This is not to discredit the incredible efforts of the leagues of Egyptian 
civilians that risked their lives in the beginning of 2011 to see an end to Mubarak’s rule. 
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Without them, nothing would have changed in Egypt. I firmly believe, however, that the 
tipping point of the revolution occurred as a direct result of the military’s noncompliance.  
To a certain extent, the Egyptian case fits Samuel Fitch’s theory of political 
professionalism. The idea that professionalism prevents militaries from politically 
intervening, he says, is a representation of Western ethnocentric thought.159 His studies of 
Latin American civil-military relations have actually proved just the opposite – that 
“higher levels of military professionalization have in fact generally resulted in more 
institutionalized forms of military intervention in politics and rejection of civilian 
control.”160 Fitch further dissects his theory, proposing two outcomes of political 
professionalism: tutelary regimes or conditional democracies.161 It is the latter of the two 
outcomes, conditional democracies, that applies most directly to the Egyptian case. In a 
conditional democracy, the military “remains in the background politically, yet it 
indirectly influences policy and remains prepared to intervene if it judges that national 
security is threatened by the actions of the civilian regime.”162  We saw the Egyptian 
military do just this: it remained in the background until the conditions of the revolution 
prompted it to intervene on the side of the populace.  
  Further, the SCAF’s erratic behavior throughout the transition period has 
demonstrated its desire to maintain this conditional democracy.  After the fall of Mubarak 
and the subsequent power transfer to the SCAF, its “zigzag approach to politics” has 
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made the process of deciphering its interests very challenging.163 It has, for instance, 
“oscillated from an apparently heartfelt desire to transfer power in a timely manner … to 
taking steps extending the process seemingly in order to safeguard its interests.”164  The 
inconsistency is due in part to a conflict of interest, in which the military wants to 
maintain all of its privileges – “such as a secret budget sheltered from civilian oversight; 
de facto immunity from prosecution;” and its control over large portions of the economy 
– but at the same time has no intention of actually governing.165  In other words, the 
SCAF wants all the power but does not want to be blamed for the social and economy 
instability that will likely ensue as the result of this transition.  What I propose is that this 
conditional democracy will persist and continue to undermine the legitimacy of Morsi’s 
leadership unless he attempts to unravel the officers’ republic.  
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IX: Conclusion 
 Since the election in June of 2012, President Mohamed Morsi’s strategies of 
controlling the Egyptian military have fallen short of confronting the powerful military 
legacy that persists as a result of sixty years of military dominance throughout Egyptian 
culture and society. While his initiatives have been symbolically bold, his tactics of 
civilian control have only established institutional changes that limit the legal functions 
of the military in the matters of legislative and executive authority.  These measures are 
no match against the militaristic culture that characterizes Egyptian society– a culture that 
is valued by both the armed forces and the populace.  
Both Nasser and Sadat implemented policies that contributed greatly to the 
persistence of military dominance. Nasser initially politicized the armed forces, giving 
them significant access to political participation and decision-making. Sadat’s strategies 
of de-politicization and professionalization transformed the military into an effective 
fighting force.  As a result, the military became a widely popular and highly respected 
institution of the state.  
 Mubarak’s strategies of control, however, were the most significant of the three. 
The officers’ republic reached its most pervasive state under Mubarak’s rule, as he 
complemented Sadat’s former strategies of de-politicization and professionalization with 
cooptation.  The privileges that the military gained from this plan of mutual 
accommodation granted it access to nearly all sectors of Egyptian society, which 
effectively turned it into an autonomous institution.   
I argue that the most dangerous consequence of Mubarak’s military society was 
the transformation of the Egyptian concept of social order.  As a result of its 
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pervasiveness, the military gained a higher social status than it ever had before, which 
reinforced the notion of militaristic paternalism within Egyptian culture.   
Looking forward, what lies ahead in the Egyptian transition is the development of 
a new constitution. I predict that the writing of a new constitution will have huge 
consequences for the balance of power in the state.  At this time, the legacy of Mubarak’s 
strategies provides the military with the necessary power, autonomy, and legitimacy to 
react in any way that it chooses. If the constitution caters too heavily to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, for instance, it is possible that the military could stage a coup in opposition.  
If Morsi goes too far in the coming months in attempting to further rein in military 
authority, that too could cause a dramatic reaction from the armed forces.  
The military wants to maintain the prerogatives and privileges it enjoyed 
throughout its past.  If the constitution significantly limits those privileges, I believe that 
we can expect a strong military reaction to follow. However, if Morsi does not want to 
emerge from the writing of this constitution as the civilian puppet of the military, he must 
make some significant changes that will instigate the process of unraveling the officers’ 
republic.  In this way, it is clear that Morsi is straddling a very fine line.   
The Egyptian military, as it has become the most powerful institution of the state 
over the past sixty years, is an essential component of this transition. While the future of 
Egypt and the prospect of a transition to genuine democracy is momentarily unclear, it is 
certain that the military will undoubtedly influence its direction. 
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